


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# STAFF NOTES:

## Middle East Africa South Asia

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25X1

Approved For Release 2005/04/19 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400030046-6

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


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*CONTENTS*

Angola: Nationalist Groups May Be Edging  
Toward Civil War. . . . .1

Ivory Coast: Houphouet-Boigny Provides  
for a Constitutional Successor. . . . .6



25X1

June 10, 1975

SECRET

Angola

*Nationalist Groups May Be  
Edging Toward Civil War*

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, the principal nationalist groups in the transitional government, may be edging Angola toward civil war.

The two groups have clashed repeatedly during the past two months in northern Angola, as well as in Luanda and Cabinda. The Popular Movement appears determined to establish military superiority over its long-standing rival.

Last week, the Popular Movement also attacked units in Luanda of the smaller National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. The National Union, which has tried to remain aloof, fought back.

None of the three has the supplies or the mobility to wage a sustained military campaign, but the two larger groups appear to be preparing for that eventuality.

Bitter Rivals

The rivalry between the Popular Movement and the National Front dates back to the late 1950s; the early years of Angolan nationalism. Throughout the insurgency against Portugal, which began in 1961, the two groups fought each other almost as much as they did the Portuguese.

In the early years, the National Front was dominant and was favored by the Organization of African Unity. By the late 1960s, however, it was overshadowed by the Popular Movement, which was able to swing most African states behind its cause. It also received a steady stream of military supplies from the USSR.

The transitional government installed last January has encouraged more competition than cooperation. It was constructed on a system of checks and

(Continued)

June 10, 1975

SECRET

1

balances in which members of one liberation group find themselves working, as government officials, with subordinates from the other groups.

The integrated political, military, and police organizations of the transitional government have failed to maintain order because of the conflicting interests of the three participating groups.

Portuguese officials are not very effective because they are caught in the middle. Portugal still has about 24,000 troops in the territory, but most of them are stationed in and around Luanda. All of them are anxious to go home and would probably be unwilling to get involved in prolonged fighting.

#### Separate Armies

A major problem is that the independence agreement allows each of the three to maintain a separate army. Each group is required to contribute to an integrated national army, but all have shirked this commitment, steadily building up their own military forces, particularly in the northern half of the territory and in and around Luanda.

The National Front and the Popular Movement draw the bulk of their tribal support from northern Angola and maintain their heaviest concentrations of troops there.

The two largest groups have established important bases in northern Angola and dominate major supply routes to Luanda. The National Front has gained control of the port of Ambrizete, in northwestern Angola, partially relieving it of its dependence on Zaire.

Fighting in northern Angola on May 28 was started by a Popular Movement drive to disrupt the Front's supply routes and to force the National Front out of areas where the Movement's tribal supporters pre-dominate. The Movement apparently suspected that a similar operation was launched by the National Front.

(Continued)

June 10, 1975

SECRET

SECRET

Reliable figures on the troop strengths of the respective groups are difficult to obtain. The groups inflate or deflate their own figures according to political necessity.

It would appear, however, that each of the two major groups has about 8,000 to 10,000 troops in Angola, the bulk of which are in northern Angola. The third nationalist group, the National Union, has about 3,000 troops.

The Popular Movement apparently has several thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been active. The other two groups have much smaller forces there.

The National Front may have an additional 10,000 troops in Zaire being trained by Chinese and Zairian instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese army officers who have been purged by the military government in Lisbon as "politically unreliable."

#### Advantage in Luanda

The Popular Movement has demonstrated that it can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage in the capital city.

In recent months, the Popular Movement has been receiving more military supplies from the Soviets. These supplies are sent to Congo--long an important base for the Popular Movement--and are forwarded to Angola, [REDACTED]

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(Continued)

June 10, 1975

SECRET

SECRET

The National Front is actively--some reports suggest desperately--seeking additional weapons and money abroad, particularly from West European and Persian Gulf countries. The fragmentary information available suggests the effort has not been very successful.

Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country suffered years of civil war, is particularly sensitive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola. Both Zaire and Zambia, moreover, rely heavily on rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their copper.

Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement gaining control of Angola, but he does not seem able to provide the Front with what it needs to attain military superiority.

#### The Cabinda Problem

The three Angolan groups and the Portuguese regard Cabinda, long administered as a district of Angola, as an integral part of the territory. The OAU supports this position.

Mobutu, however, would like to see Cabinda detached from Angola, and is pushing the view that the Cabindans should be allowed to decide their own political status. He has allowed a small Cabindan separatist group to establish a headquarters in Kinshasa and has given it modest financial and technical support.

A rival faction of the Cabindan separatist group is based in Brazzaville. Both factions have representatives in Cabinda, where each has a public following. Neither faction is able to challenge the three larger groups for control of Cabinda.

None of the three larger groups has enough popular support in Angola to win a majority in a constituent assembly election that is supposed to be held before the end of October. The assembly is to select a head of government to assume office upon independence.

(Continued)

June 10, 1975

4

SECRET





The three groups could agree to postpone the national election, thus reducing the immediacy of the competition between the Movement and the Front. Only the Movement, however, now seems to favor a postponement.

All three, along with the Portuguese, stand firm on November 11 as the date for independence. Unless the three can compromise on a head of government, Angola will become independent without a strong central leader.

#### Agreement to Meet

The leaders of the three groups have agreed to meet in Kenya beginning next Sunday, according to an announcement made late yesterday by the Kenyan foreign minister. The purposes of this meeting are to attempt to stop the fighting in Angola and to discuss the shape of a post-independence government.

Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union, which has remained out of most of the fighting, could emerge as a compromise choice as head of state. Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto will have to subordinate their rivalry for the sake of Angolan unity; if they do not, any compromise arranged at a summit will only postpone an all-out conflict between the two antagonists.

25X1



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June 10, 1975

SECRET

Ivory Coast

*Houphouet-Boigny Provides for  
a Constitutional Successor*

The Ivorian constitution is being amended at President Houphouet-Boigny's direction to designate, for the first time, a specific successor to the president.

The constitutional amendment provides that, upon the president's death or total disability, the president of the national assembly shall assume the presidency and serve out the president's remaining term of office.

The mantle of succession clearly has been placed on Philippe Yace, the government's number two man. Yace has served for 15 years as president of the national assembly and secretary general of the country's sole political party. The 55-year-old Yace, who suffers from periodic bouts of ill-health, had generally been considered Houphouet-Boigny's unofficial heir-apparent. He probably is better known to most Ivorians than any of Houphouet-Boigny's other close associates who have been waiting in the wings for the president's nod. Yace has been seen at the President's side on all important public occasions and during the latter's recent extensive tours of the interior.

If Yace succeeds to the presidency, he could nevertheless face some problems in gaining full acceptance. So far, he has been given little chance by Houphouet-Boigny to develop a significant base of support outside the ranks of the party stalwarts. One of his drawbacks stems from the fact that he comes from a small coastal tribe with little political clout. Yace also has acquired enemies as the President's

(Continued)

June 10, 1975

SECRET

SECRET

hatchet-man and he is not well liked by many students and young educated government and party workers.

The President himself appears to be in generally good health as he approaches his 70th birthday. He is now winding up his third 5-year term since Ivory Coast became independent in 1960 and is certain to stand for reelection this November. As long as Houphouet-Boigny remains in power Ivory coast may be expected to continue as one of black Africa's notable success stories where an impressive degree of political stability and economic progress has been achieved.

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25X1

June 10, 1975

SECRET

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